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Comments
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation
Should Be Rejected
In Edwards v. NationalAudubon Society, Inc.,1 the Second Circuit
recognized a first amendment constitutional privilege to republish
newsworthy defamatory falsehoods irrespective of the second pub-
lisher's subjective awareness of the statement's falsity. At common law,
republication of a known falsehood is privileged as a fair report only
when the calumny reported was made at an official proceeding or pub-
lic meeting.2 The Edwards "neutral reportage" privilege, however,
would protect a "fair" and "accurate" report of any defamatory false-
hood made by a "responsible" and "prominent" organization or per-
son, even if the first publication was made in a private conversation. 3
Thus, the Edwards decision would subsume the common law privilege.
Although the Edwards decision purported to follow the Supreme
Court's first amendment theory,4 a careful analysis of first amendment
theory indicates that Edwards was inappropriately decided. This Com-
ment briefly examines the nature and theoretical bases of the common
law privilege of fair report. Next, it examines Edwards and suggests
that it incorrectly relied on the Court's opinion in Time, Inc. v. Pape5
for its holding. The Comment then analyzes first amendment theory as
enunciated by the Supreme Court. A comparison of the Supreme
Court's first amendment analysis in defamation actions with the Ed-
wards court's neutral reportage analysis reveals the incongruity be-
tween the Edwards rationale and the first amendment rationale
developed by the Supreme Court in the area of defamation. The
Supreme Court has recognized that protection of freedom of expression
must be tempered by the state's legitimate interest in protecting the rep-
utation of its citizens.6 The Edwards neutral reportage privilege, how-
ever, gives a reporter absolute immunity for reporting a newsworthy,
1. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
2. See notes 16-27 & accompanying text infra.
3. 556 F.2d at 120.
4. See id.
5. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
6. See notes 76-98 & accompanying text infra.
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defamatory statement and gives insufficient weight to the counter-
vailing state interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens. The
Comment, therefore, concludes that the neutral reportage privilege es-
tablished in Edwards is inconsistent with first amendment theory and
gives inadequate protection to the individual's reputation.
Common Law Defamation and the Privilege of Fair Report
The law of civil defamation embodies the public policy that one
should enjoy one's reputation unimpaired by defamatory attacks.7 At
common law, defamation8 is defined as a false communication that
"tends so to harm [one's] reputation. . . as to lower him in the estima-
tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."9 Each publication ° of a defamatory communica-
tion constitutes a separate cause of action.I Thus, even if one merely
repeats what was heard and identifies the source of the communica-
tion 12 or adds such qualifying words as "it is alleged,13 one is liable for
7. See, e.g., Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally 53
C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 4 (1948).
8. Because of historical anomaly, the law of civil defamation consists of two distinct
torts-libel and slander. See general y L.H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, §§ 12-
15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ELDREDGE]; 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 2
(1969); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 111-112 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SECOND RE-
STATEMENT]. This statement is, perhaps, the best modem definition of a defamatory com-
munication. A more eloquent, but less inclusive, definition is found in 1 E. SEELMAN, THE
LAw OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK 1 18 (1964).
10. Publication is necessary for harm to result to one's reputation. "Publication" is the
technical term used to describe the communication that gives rise to actionable defamation.
Publication results when the defamatory falsehood is communicated to a third person. Un-
less the defamation is repeated to someone other than the defamed, there can be no harm to
reputation, and there is no publication. See general,y ELDREDGE, supra note 8, § 35, at 205;
PROSSER, supra note 8, § 113, at 766.
11. See, e.g., Lubore v. Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C.
1951), a ffd, 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Nance v. Flaugh, 221 Ark. 352, 253 S.W.2d 207
(1952); Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Maier, 128 Colo. 263, 261 P.2d 489 (1953); Graff v.
Arlington Seating Co., 343 Ill. App. 266 (abstract), 98 N.E.2d 552 (1951). This basic propo-
sition underlying the law of defamation has been altered in some jurisdictions by the "single
publication" rule. Under this approach, each issue or edition of a newspaper, book, or mag-
azine gives rise to a single cause of action, regardless of the number of times the defamation
is exposed to different people. E.g., Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J.
Super. 371, 330 A.2d 38 (1974), af'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (1976).
12. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1968); Nance v. Flaugh, 221 Ark. 352, 253
S.W.2d 207 (1952); Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, 65 Il. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
13. Cf. MacRae v. Afro-American Co., 172 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1959), arf'd, 274
F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1960) (defendant liable for republication even though defamatory aver-
ments described as "whispers" and "rumors"); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 578
comment c.
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the unprivileged republication of a defamatory utterance. 14 Liability is
based upon the principle that one who repeats a defamation adopts it
as one's own.
15
A common law exception to this rule is the privilege of fair re-
port. 16 Although the scope of the privilege varies,17 it generally pro-
14. See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1980);
Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1977).
15. Sanders v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 168 La. 1125, 123 So. 804 (1929).
16. Under the common law, there are three types of privilege: the absolute privilege,
the conditional privilege, and the special privilege. The absolute privilege provides absolute
immunity from civil liability for libel and slander. It is immaterial that the individual com-
municating the defamation was motivated solely by common law malice--ill will or spite-
or was aware that it was false. See ELDREDGE, supra note 8, §§ 72-77, at 339-418; 1 A.
HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 108-112, at 85-93 (1969); PROSSER, supra note 8,
§ 114, at 776-85. The conditional or "qualified" privileges are based "upon a public policy
that recognizes it is essential that true information be given whenever it is reasonably neces-
sary for one's interest, the interest of third persons or certain interests of the public." SEc-
OND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 592A, at 258, topic 3. Under the common law, however,
the conditional privilege exists only when certain requirements are met. It can be destroyed
when the publisher does not believe the statement to be true or lacks reasonable grounds for
believing it to be true. Id. § 593 comment c. See generally ELDREDGE, supra note 8, §§ 83-
94, at 447-542; 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 1 123-141, at 95-110; PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 115, at 785.
The special privileges often are called conditional privileges by commentators. See,
ag., 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 133, at 100 (1969). The special privileges
("fair report" privileges), like the conditional privileges, exist only when certain require-
ments are met. Unlike the conditional privileges, however, the special privileges of fair re-
port often immunize from liability the reporter who knows his or her defamatory
communication is false. See ELDREDGE, supra note 8, § 78, at 420; SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 611 comment a.
17. Because this privilege has developed at common law, it lacks uniformity in its ap-
plication. Each state has determined the degree to which its citizens' interests in their repu-
tation will be subordinated to the public interest in the availability of information about
official proceedings. There are at least three approaches among the jurisdictions in applying
the fair report privilege. First, some jurisdictions extend the privilege to fair and accurate
reports of proceedings upon which no official action has been taken. See Hayward v. Wat-
sonville Register-Pajaronian & Sun, 265 Cal. App. 2d 255, 71 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1968); Camp-
bell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1927). But see Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611
comment c.
Second, some jurisdictions hold that the privilege is defeated, although the report is
both fair and accurate, when the republisher was motivated solely by malice-ll will or
spite. See American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Brink's, Inc., 380 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1967); Fairbanks
Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1964); Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc.,
3411. 2d 112, 115, 214 N.E.2d 746,748 (1966); Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586
(1963); Gerlach v. Gruett, 175 Wis. 354, 185 N.W. 195 (1921); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 611 comment a (1938). Others extend the privilege regardless of the
publisher's motive. See, e.g., Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 46
Cal. Rptr. 135, 143-44 (1965); see also SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611.
Third, a few jurisdictions extend the privilege to reports of public, nongovernmental
proceedings. Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (church meeting); Morin v.
Houston Press Co., 103 S.W.2d 1087, 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (campaign speech).
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tects the publication of fair 18 and accurate' 9 reports of public
meetings20 and judicial proceedings.21 This protection is extended even
when an individual is defamed during the proceeding or action.
22
The fair report privilege does not alter the public policy of protect-
ing an individual's reputation interest. Rather, the privilege accommo-
dates a countervailing public or social interest in the availability of
information about official proceedings and public meetings.23 Because
the public or social interest being accommodated is the public's interest
in receiving information from public meetings and official proceedings,
the privilege is unaffected by the republisher's knowledge of the falsity
of the statement reported.24
18. The report must be complete; it must give the reader the same impression of the
meeting that the reader would have had, had he or she attended the meeting. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Vaughan, 278 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Brush-
Moore Newspapers v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 151 A.2d 530 (1959); SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 611 comment f.
19. It is not necessary that the report be accurate in every detail as long as it conveys a
substantially correct account of the proceedings to those who read it. See, e.g., Hartzog v.
United Press Ass'ns, 202 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1953); Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Pollitt,
220 Md. 132, 151 A.2d 530 (1959); Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963); see
also SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment f.
20. See, e.g., Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884); Danziger v.
Hearst Corp., 304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952). But see SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra
note 9, § 611 comment d: "It is not clear whether the privilege extends to a report of an
official proceeding that is not public or available to the public under the law." Statements
must be made in an official capacity. Short v. News-Journal Co., 58 Del. 592, 597-98, 212
A.2d 718, 722 (1965); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment d. The privilege
does not apply to statements made in an unofficial capacity. Venn v. Tennessean Newspa-
pers Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47, 56-57 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). The privilege, however, extends to
reports of the proceedings or actions of legislative bodies, e.g., McCracken v. Gainesville
Tribune, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 274, 246 S.E.2d 360 (1978); Coleman v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 381, 149 A.2d 193 (1959); Orr v. Dispatch Publishing Co., 65 York
129 (Pa. C.P. 1951); to reports of the proceedings or actions of an executive body, Brandon v.
Gazette Publishing Co., 234 Ark. 332, 352 S.W.2d 92 (1961); and to reports of proceedings or
actions of an administrative body, SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment d.
See generally Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment. The Case for a Constitutional
Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sowle].
21. E.g., Rhodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658, 661, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 822 (1962); Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952).
22. The fair report privilege also extends to fair and accurate reports of official docu-
ments issued by the government. E.g., Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal, 299 F. 487
(6th Cir. 1924); Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963). It is applicable to the
report of any proceeding, action, or document of governments at the local, state, or federal
level, or of bodies authorized by law to perform a public duty. SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 611 comment d.
23. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment a.
24. Id. See note 16 supra. Some courts have ruled that, when one republishes solely
for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed, the fair report privilege is defeated
because one is not publishing to further any societal interest. The fairness or accuracy of the
report is immaterial. See, e.g., American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Brink's, Inc., 380 F.2d 131 (7th
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Although the fair report privilege immunizes one who repeats a
defamatory statement, it does not destroy the actionable character of
the defamation.25 Rather, it is used as a defense.26 But for the privi-
lege, the republisher would be liable for his or her repetition of the
defamation.27
Theories Underlying the Common Law Fair Report Privilege
Two theories have been articulated to justify subordinating the de-
famed individual's interest in his or her reputation to the public's inter-
est in the information: the agency and supervision theories. The
agency theory rationalizes protecting the reporter because he or she
acts as a substitute or agent for the public. 28 As any member of the
public lawfully can attend a public meeting or official proceeding, the
reporter, in a fair and accurate report, merely communicates to the
public what it would have seen or heard had it been present. 29 The
public's right to the information, therefore, arises from its right to at-
tend the meeting.
30
The supervision theory subordinates the individual's reputation
Cir. 1967); Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1964); Lulay v.
Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 IMl. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746 (1966); Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa.
595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 611 comment a
(1938). The American Law Institute has removed the portion of § 611 that refers to defeat
of the privilege when defamatory republication occurs solely for the purpose of causing
harm to the individual defamed. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611. Professor
Eldredge has criticized the Second Restatement's formulation of this aspect of the fair report
privilege, contending that the First Restatement better restates the common law doctrine.
ELDREDGE, supra note 8, § 79, at 426.
25. Short v. News-Journal Co., 58 DeL 592,212 A.2d 718 (1965); Montgomery v. Phila-
delphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
26. Short v. News-Journal Co., 58 Del. 592,212 A.2d 718 (1965); see also Yowe v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 11 A.D.2d 663, 218 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1960) (discovery of insurance com-
pany's records to disclose a defamatory report not disallowed by privilege, which is a de-
fense, not a bar to the action).
27. See notes 11-13 & accompanying text supra.
28. E.g., Lee v. Brooklyn Union Publishing Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 248-49, 103 N.E. 155,
156 (1913); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 44 Tenn. App. 694, 709, 318 S.W.2d 568, 575
(1958).
29. See, e.g., American Publishing Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663, 678, 90 S.W. 1005,
1008 (1906).
30. The agency theory inadequately justifies the privilege of fair report. The agency
theory rests on the assumption that, simply because a member of the public could have
witnessed the defamatory falsehood, he or she should be informed of it. See, e.g., Borg v.
Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1956). This assumption, however, confuses those elements that
justify extending the fair report privilege to republication of defamation with those that
merely indicate the situations in which the privilege may exist. See generally Note, Privilege
to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1102, 1116-17 (1964). At common law, each
publication of a defamatory falsehood is actionable. See notes 12-15 & accompanying text
supra. The agency theory merely explains the situations in which a republication is not
actionable, but does not explain why the reporter is not liable for the republication. The
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interest to the public's need for information for the purpose of supervis-
ing official conduct. Justice Holmes explained this theory in Cowley v.
Puisfer:31
Though the publication of such proceedings may be to the disadvan-
tage of the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast impor-
tance to the public that the proceedings of courts of justice should be
universally known. . . . The chief advantage [of the publication] is
the proper administration of justice. . . . [Ilt is of the highest mo-
ment that those who administer justice should always act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to
satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public
duty is performed.
32
Although Justice Holmes's discussion was in the context of the
privilege for a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding, the
rationale of the supervision theory applies with equal force to fair and
accurate reports of all types of official proceedings and public meet-
ings. 33 The disclosure of such information allows the public to oversee
the performance of public functions.
Both the agency and supervision theories focus on the public's
right to know the content of an official meeting or judicial proceeding.
The republication of a defamatory falsehood under the fair report priv-
ilege, therefore, is protected because the recipients of the report, the
public, have a legitimate and overriding interest in the information.
The reporter, on the other hand, does not have an independent interest
protected by the privilege. 34 The reporter acts only as the conduit
through which the public learns of the content of official meetings or
judicial proceedings. The reporter is protected, therefore, only because
the public has a right to the information republished.
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.
In Edwards v. NationalAudubon Society, Inc.,35 the Second Circuit
ruled that the public interest protected by the common law fair report
privilege should be constitutionally protected under the first amend-
agency theory, therefore, reduces the fair report privilege to descriptive, rather than norma-
tive, terms.
31. 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884).
32. Id. at 394. For a recent affirmation of this theory, see Shiles v. News Syndicate Co.,
27 N.Y.2d 9, 14, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1970).
33. See generally Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 1102,
1104 (1964) (with the growth of electoral responsibility in government, the courts, to ensure
increased public supervision, have extended the privilege to reports of legislative and admin-
istrative proceedings).
34. For this reason, the privilege is inapplicable to reports of judicial proceedings when
such reports are inaccurate, unfair, or published solely to harm the person defamed.
35. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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ment.3 6 The Edwards litigation arose from an acrimonious dispute be-
tween the National Audubon Society and proponents of the pesticide
DDT.37 The Society contended that the proponents of DDT misused
the Society's Christmas bird count data to prove that DDT had no
harmful effects on the bird population.38 The editor of the National
Audubon Society's publication, American Birds, charged in the fore-
word to the April 1972 issue that the use of data by "scientist-spokes-
men" of the pesticide industry was a "distortion of the facts for the
most self-serving of reasons. '39 He further admonished that "any time
you hear a 'scientist' say the opposite, you are in the presence of some-
one who is being paid to lie, or is parroting something he knows little
about."
40
These general accusations came to the attention of a New York
Times reporter, who asked the editor of American Birds for the names
of those scientists the Society believed to be "paid liars." Unable to
provide the reporter with names of any individuals who could with as-
surance be classified as "paid liars," the editor consulted the Society's
staff biologist and vice-president. According to the editor, the vice-
36. Id. at 120. In its subsequent decision of Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, C.J., concurring), the court limited the breadth of the
immunity conferred by the neutral reportage privilege. The Cand court recognized that
careful limitation of the privilege was required. Id. at 68-70. In Ciancz New Times maga-
zine featured a story reporting that a public official had at one time been accused of raping a
woman. Id. at 56. Although the article stated that the mayor denied the charge, it did not
contain his version of the incident. Id. at 69. The court limited Edwards to its facts, stating
that the media enjoyed the neutral reportage privilege only with respect to public officials
and public figures. Id. at 67, 69 n.17 (dictum). It was not disputed that the mayor was a
public figure. The Court further noted that, unlike in Edwards in which the report was
"fair" and accurate, in Cianci the magazine had espoused or concurred in the charges made
against the mayor. It therefore had failed to take a neutral stance. Id. at 69. Thus, although
the mayor was considered a public figure, the Cianci court refused to apply the Edwards
neutral reportage privilege. For a discussion criticizing the Canei analysis, see Comment,
Restricting the First Amendment Right to Republish Defamatory Statements, Cianei v. New
Times Publishing Co., 69 GEo. L.L 1495 (1981).
Although the Cianci court has retreated from the sweeping statements and analysis used
in Edwards, other courts have interpreted the neutral reportage privilege to.apply to private
persons. See note 52 & accompanying text infra. Moreover, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the question of the existence of a constitutional privilege of neutral reportage, see
Ciand, 639 F.2d at 67, or determined what form, if any, such a privilege would take.
37. Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT) is a water-insoluble crystalline insecti-
cide that tends to accumulate in ecosystems.
38. The Society's Christmas bird count is an annual compilation by Audubon Society
members of the number of birds they sighted in the field during the year. DDT proponents
argued that the steady increase in the number of birds counted indicated that the pesticide
did not harm bird life. The Society rejoined that the rising bird counts were caused by an
increase in the number of individuals counting birds and better access to the count areas
rather than by an increase in the bird population. 556 F.2d at 116.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 117.
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president was able to supply him only with the names of five eminent
scientists who had most frequently misused the bird count data. 41 The
published story reported that these scientists had been accused of being
paid liars by the National Audubon Society, and included the denials
of three of the five scientists named.
The opinion of the Second Circuit, written by Chief Judge Kauf-
mann, concluded that a reporter is constitutionally protected under the
first amendment by a right of "neutral reportage," the right to publish
fair and accurate accounts of false, defamatory statements regardless of
the reporter's subjective awareness of the statements' falsity.
42
[W]hen a responsible, prominent organization like the National Au-
dubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First
Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of
those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding
their validity. What is newsworthy about such statements is that they
were made. We do not believe that the press may be required under
the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely be-
cause it has serious doubts regarding their truth. . . . The public
interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage
around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the free-
dom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for
them.
43
Thus, according to the Second Circuit, the first amendment immunizes
a reporter from liability for defamation even when the reporter has se-
rious doubts concerning the truth of the republished statement. Be-
cause newsworthy defamatory statements affect the public welfare, the
public has a right to hear them.an
The defamatory statements in Edwards were deemed newsworthy
because they were made by a "responsible" and "prominent" organiza-
tion, because of the acrimonious debate surrounding the DDT contro-
versy, and because they concerned "public figures. '45  The reporter's
41. Id. The editor further testified that the vice-president had emphasized that the
names were being given to the reporter with the understanding that the Society did not have
knowledge of any "paid liars." Id. The editor testified that he had conveyed these qualifica-
tions to the reporter. The reporter denied that he had been so informed, asserting that the
names had been presented to him as the names of the "paid liars" referred to in the Ameri-
can Birds foreword. Id.
42. The court's opinion was based on alternative grounds. 556 F.2d at 120. Judge
Kaufmann also held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden under the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964), actual malice rule. See notes 75-93 & ac-
companying text infra. The plaintiffs in Edwards had neither proved that the Times had
known the Society's accusations were false nor demonstrated that the Times had had serious
doubts about the truth or falsity of the accusations. The Times was therefore constitution-
ally protected by the New York Times rule. 556 F.2d at 121.
43. 556 F.2d at 120.
44. Id. at 115, 120.
45. Id. at 120. In focusing upon the newsworthiness of the defamatory statements,
Judge Kaufmann stated, "What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were
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subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the Society's accusations
was irrelevant.46 Constitutional protection of the right to report such
statements fairly47 and accurately, 48 the court suggested, would ensure
public awareness of important issues. The court concluded, therefore,
that the public's interest in newsworthy information outweighed an in-
dividual's reputation interest,49 even when defamatory falsehoods were
published with "actual malice."'50
Although the theoretical justifications of the common law fair re-
made." 556 F.2d at 120. This attitude supports the thesis that "newsworthiness" is by nature
a descriptive rather than a normative term. If whatever the press prints is, by virtue of that
fact, newsworthy, then the press becomes the arbiter of constitutional concerns. See Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.
267, 283. This theory, therefore, exhibits the same shortcomings as the agency theory of the
fair report privilege. See note 30 supra.
46. 556 F.2d at 120.
47. In Edwards, the Times reporter obtained the names from the Audubon Society's
editor in a telephone conversation. Although the court indicated that the accusations had
been fairly and accurately conveyed, it did not indicate whether or not a reporter must make
an effort to contact the "accused" individuals to obtain a response. It is not clear whether
neutral reportage requires opportunity for rebuttal, or how much effort a reporter must ex-
pend to obtain any response to the original defamatory statements.
Under the common law fair report privilege, individuals are protected by due process in
judicial proceedings and by policies employed in public meetings and official proceedings.
Usually, character attacks during judicial proceedings are made to discredit one's testimony.
In such an action, the person defamed has an opportunity to respond and expose the cal-
umny before it is published in a newspaper. Public meetings usually are publicized, so that
individuals have knowledge that they are being held. This publicity provides an opportu-
nity for attendance and rebuttal of defamatory attacks.
The neutral reportage privilege may not have these safeguards. If charges made over
the telephone in a private conversation are newsworthy and republication is privileged with-
out an effort to obtain the accused's response, the traditional meaning of "fairness" will be
severely circumscribed. Although a response was printed in the article at issue in Edwards,
it is not clear whether the Edwards privilege requires an opportunity for rebuttal.
48. In Edwards, there was direct evidence that the names, received in the telephone
conversation, had been misused. See 423 F. Supp. 516, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). It is un-
clear upon what basis the Edwards court made the determination that the accusations had
been accurately reported. In judicial proceedings and other public, official proceedings,
transcripts, minutes, and witnesses are available to test the "substantial accuracy" of the
report.
49. The court placed great value on the public interest in a free press. In Judge Kauf-
mann's words: "In a society which takes seriously the principle that government rests upon
the consent of the governed, freedom of the press must be the most cherished tenet." 556
F.2d at 115. At the same time, individual reputation was accorded little value. Id. at 120.
50. "Actual malice" is the term applied by the Supreme Court to a standard of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The use of the term by Justice Brennan was
unfortunate, because the definition given is actually that of scienter. ELDREDGE, supra note
8, § 51, at 254 n.41. Confusion has developed because actual malice at common law requires
a showing of ill will or spite. The Supreme Court, in recent cases, has ceased using the term.
Id;see, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971). See notes 68-80
& accompanying text infra.
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port privilege are well developed, 5' the theoretical underpinnings of an
Edwards neutral reportage privilege are not. Decisions following Ed-
wards demonstrate doctrinal uncertainty. Several decisions suggest
that the Second Circuit intended the neutral reportage privilege to ex-
tend to all newsworthy statements.52 Other decisions suggest that the
neutral reportage privilege is limited to newsworthy statements con-
cerning public figures or public officials.5 3 The initial question, how-
ever, is whether the first amendment theory enunciated by the Supreme
Court supports the recognition of any formulation of a constitutional
neutral reportage privilege.
Time, Inc. v. Pape
In Edwards, the Second Circuit inferred from the Supreme Court
decision in Time, Inc. v. Pape54 that a constitutional privilege of neutral
reportage is consistent with first amendment theory.5 5 Reliance upon
Pape to support a constitutional neutral reportage privilege, however,
is misplaced.
5 6
The only major issue in Pape was whether an inaccurate report of
an ambiguous government document provided "sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. v57 The Pape litigation arose
51. See notes 31-34 & accompanying text supra.
52. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978); Krauss v. Champaign
News Gazette, 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (1978). This view is consistent
with language in Edwards that suggests that application of neutral reportage depends upon
the "newsworthiness" of the statement, not the status, whether it is public official, public
figure, or private individual, of the person defamed. This conclusion is bolstered by Judge
Kaufmann's opinion in Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). He explained that, in Edwards, "we held that a newspaper
could not libel an individual when the reporter is engaged in the neutral reportage of news-
worthy material." Id. (emphasis added). But see Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Weingarten
v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 714-15, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 288, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 284 (1980).
54. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
55. 556 F.2d at 120.
56. Dean Prosser, in characterizing the Pape decision, noted that "with the application
under the Constitution of the rule of the Sullivan case, it seems beyond dispute that even if
the report is an inaccurate one, it is privileged unless it is made with knowledge of the falsity
or in reckless disregard of its truth." PROSSER, supra note 8, § 118, at 832; see also SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment b.
57. 401 U.S. at 291-92 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). See
generally Sowle, supra note 20, at 501-08. The Pape decision followed the Supreme Court's
decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the Court estab-
lished the constitutional privilege of fair comment. After New York Times, a public official
was required to prove that a media defendant had published a defamatory falsehood with
knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement. 376 U.S. at 279-80. St.
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from a Time magazine article concerning a United States Commission
on Civil Rights report on police brutality. In the report, the Commis-
sion quoted at length from a complaint, filed pursuant to the Federal
Civil Rights Act,58 alleging specific violations of complainant's civil
rights. The article, however, reported the alleged civil rights violations
as independent findings of the Commission.59 Thus, the article repre-
sented that the Commission itself had found that the plaintiff had vio-
lated the complainant's civil rights, when in fact the Commission report
had cited a judicial complaint containing allegations that the plaintiff
had violated the complainant's civil rights.
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that press reports
of what someone has said about an event are difficult to analyze, when
the press report is alleged to be calumny as written.60 The Court indi-
cated, however, that failure to attribute the statement to the correct
source does not presumptively raise the issue of actual malice.
61
Rather, to establish actual malice, the plaintiff must demonstrate with
convincing clarity that the reporter knew of the falsity, or entertained
serious doubts about the truth or falsity, of the publication.6 2 As the
Commission report was ambiguous, the Court concluded that the re-
porter's interpretation was "one of a number of possible rational inter-
pretations. ' 63 The reporter's designation of the allegations as findings
of the Commission, rather than as the substance of a complaint, "was
not enough to create a jury issue of 'malice' under New York Times."64
The Supreme Court in Pape, therefore, neither prescribed nor
foreclosed a constitutional neutral reportage privilege. The Court de-
cided only that an inaccurate republication of a statement attributed to
another does not demonstrate that the publisher acted with "actual
malice. ' 65 The issue before the Second Circuit in Edwards, however,
was whether the reporter's subjective awareness of the falsity of an ac-
Amant v. Thompson refined this standard, holding that a showing that the defendant had
entertained serious doubts about the truth of the publication was required to prove reckless-
ness. 390 U.S. at 731.
58. 5 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 20-21 (1961).
59. 401 U.S. at 280-82, 284-85.
60. Id. at 285-86.
61. Id. at 284-85.
62. Id. at 291-92 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
63. 401 U.S. at 290.
64. Id. This conclusion is also supported by the testimony of the author of the Time
article, who testified that the context of the report of the Monroe incident indicated to him
"that the Commission believed that the incident had occurred as described [in the Time
article]. He therefore denied that he had falsified the report when he omitted the word
'alleged."' Id. at 289.
65. Id. at 289. That is, Pape involved the narrow evidentiary issue of what type of
evidence proves clearly and convincingly that one has published with actual malice. See
Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 139 (1981).
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curately reported, newsworthy, defamatory statement attributable to
another should subject the reporter to liability for republication of the
defamatory statement.
66
The distinction between Pape and Edwards is important. Pape,
because it involved an evidentiary rather than a substantive issue, pro-
vides an inadequate basis for the Edwards neutral reportage privilege. 67
To determine the propriety of the neutral reportage privilege, therefore,
it is necessary to analyze other Supreme Court decisions enunciating
the theory underlying first amendment protection for freedom of ex-
pression in defamation cases.
First Amendment Theory of Defamation
At common law, defamatory opinion or criticism of public officials
that was not motivated by common law malice-ill will or spite68-was
protected under the fair comment privilege.69 A few jurisdictions, how-
ever, extended the privilege to defamatory misstatements of fact con-
cerning the character and qualifications of candidates for public
66. Edwards involved the substantive issue of when liability should be imposed upon a
media defendant who republishes a defamatory falsehood. 556 F.2d at 120.
67. Perhaps the court in Edwards cited Pape to support recognition of unique constitu-
tional analysis for cases involving false, defamatory statements attributable to a third party.
Such an ambitious interpretation of Pape would be misguided. The Supreme Court's state-
ment that Time magazine was quoting a third party merely emphasizes the difficulty in
accurately interpreting and communicating a third party's meaning without quoting the
statement. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 286-92 (1971). When a party is interpreting,
rather than quoting, an ambiguous report or statement, the New York Times actual malice
rule should apply. Id. at 290-91.
68. For a discussion of the distinction between common law malice and New York
Times actual malice, see note 50 supra.
69. Fair comment is a qualified privilege to comment upon matters of public interest,
such as the conduct of public officials and public employees. E.g., Everett v. California
Teachers Ass'n, 208 Cal. App. 2d 291, 25 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962); Murphy v. Daytona Beach
Humane Society, Inc., 176 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Print-
ing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930); Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Co., 220 S.C.
492, 68 S.E.2d 415 (1951); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837
(1943). See generally 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 138 (1969); PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 118, at 830. The majority of jurisdictions extended the privilege only to
statements of opinion or comment drawn from contemporaneous expressions of fact or of
assumed fact known to both parties. Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47
(M.D. Tenn. 1962); Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1
(1965); A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961); Mencher v. Chesley, 297
N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947); Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 46 Wash. 2d 666, 284 P.2d
296 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606
comment b (1938).
The majority rule of fair comment might be considered an absence of defamation
rather than a conditional privilege. A conditional privilege protects the publisher in certain
situations notwithstanding the defamatory nature of the statement. See note 16 supra. Fair
comment, on the other hand, protects the publisher's criticism of a public official that is
nondefamatory. An opinion cannot be false, if the publisher believes what he or she pub-
[Vol. 33
office. 70 In the seminal decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7'
the Supreme Court adopted the common law minority position as a
constitutional doctrine.72
Prior to New York Times, defamatory statements had not been ac-
corded constitutional protection. An individual who published a de-
famatory statement was strictly liable unless the publication was
privileged.73 "It ha[s] been well observed that such [defamatory] utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
'74
In New York Times, the Court first addressed the conflict between
the state interest in protection of individual reputation and the public
interest in free speech and free press protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments. Positing that the first amendment freedom of
speech and of the press guarantees "freedom of expression upon public
questions," 75 the Court noted "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, [and] may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
lishes. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea.").
Misstatement of fact is conceptually different from statement of opinion, but an opinion
that implies undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion and is published with
the requisite degree of subjective awareness is actionable. See SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 566; accord Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 350 (Hawaii
1975); Valentine v. North American for Life & Ins., 60111. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d 265 (1974); f
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (expression of opinion was
constitutionally protected because context of defamatory statement was merely "rhetorical
hyperbole").
70. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 284 (1908). These
jurisdictions held that the distinction between statements of opinion and statements of fact
often was spurious. In Coleman, the Kansas Supreme Court commented "that the distinc-
tions between comment and statements of fact can not always be clear to the mind. Expres-
sions of opinion and judgment frequently have all of the force of statements of fact, and pass
by insensible gradations into declarations of fact." Id. at 737, 98 P. at 290; accord Snively v.
Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. Id. at 279-82.
73. ELDREDGE, supra note 8, § 5.
74. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). This analysis has been characterized as the two-level
approach to the first amendment. Certain well-defined and narrowly limited categories of
speech, such as defamation, are not constitutionally protected because they inflict injury by
their very utterance. See Kalven, The New York Times Case.- A Note on "The Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 217. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) ("[Tlhere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.' ").
75. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." '76
Because the erroneous and perhaps defamatory statement is inevitable
in free debate, the statement must be protected so that freedom of ex-
pression will have the "breathing space" needed to survive.
77
To provide this breathing space for freedom of expression about
public officials, the Court held that a public official is precluded from
"recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves [with clear and convincing evidence] that the
statement was made with 'actual malice,' that is with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 78
This standard is required, the Court noted, to avoid self-censorship
79
and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people." 80
The Court in New York Times, therefore, limited the state's power
to protect public officials from calumny, but did not foreclose protec-
tion.8 1 The Court, however, did not abrogate the proposition that de-
famatory utterances are not essential to any exposition of ideas8 2 or
recognize that defamatory communication was inherently deserving of
constitutional protection.8 3 Rather, in balancing the public and state
interests, the Court determined that the need to provide breathing
space for freedom of expression concerning public officials outweighs
the incidental harm to reputation resulting from defamatory communi-
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 271-72.
78. Id. at 279-80. The actual malice rule was further developed in St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), in which the Court explained that "[t]here must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." Id. at 731.
79. 376 U.S. at 279.
80. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
81. As noted by Justice Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974),
societal values are being balanced. If freedom of the press were the sole value, "this Court
would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an uncondi-
tional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. . . . [Albsolute protection
for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the
law of defamation."
82. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
83. To accord constitutional value to defamatory statements would be to acknowledge
that a state has no interest in protecting its citizens' reputations. There is, however, a legiti-
mate interest underlying the law of defamation. Protection of reputation "reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity of every human being-a concept at the root
of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the pro-
tection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual states under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. . . . [T]his does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition
.. . as a basis of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring); accord Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (re-
fusing to extend actual malice standard to cases involving private persons).
FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGES
cations made without actual malice.A4
In striking this balance, the Court focused upon the status of the
public official as one holding government office. 85 The Court reasoned
that freedom of expression concerning public officials deserves protec-
tion to ensure that citizens discuss the character and qualifications of
those who serve them.8 6 Although the Court in New York Times
reached its decision because of the plaintiff's status as "public official,"
the Court extended the actual malice requirement to defamation of
"public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.8 7
In extending the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate actual
malice to defamation of "public figures," the Court again focused upon
the status of the individual defamed. Chief Justice Warren explained
that public figures, as well as public officials, often are "involved in the
resolution of important public questions or. . . shape events in areas
of concern to society at large."88 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,89 the
Court further explained that public figures have assumed pbsitions of
especial prominence in the affairs of society and usually have become
involved voluntarily in particular public controversies to effect their
resolution.90 The public has a "legitimate and substantial interest in
the conduct of such persons." 91 The state's interest in protecting the
public figure's reputation is lessened, however, because public figures
84. The conclusion that free criticism of government officials is supported by a substan-
tial public interest "does not ignore the important social values which underlie the law of
defamation. Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation. But. . ., there is a tension between this interest and the values nurtured
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The thrust of New York Times is that when
interest in discussions are [sic] particularly strong ... the Constitution limits the protection
afforded by the law of defamation. Where a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and perform-
ance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all governmental employees.., the New York Times malice standards ap-
ply." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (footnote omitted).
As balancing these competing interests requires the Justices to weigh intangible values
or interests, the Court's approach has been criticized. See, e.g., Frantz, The FirstAmendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962). But see Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
85. See 376 U.S. at 279-83.
86. Id. at 281 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286
(1908)).
87. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). For a discussion of the actual malice standard, see note 50
supra.
88. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
89. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
90. Id. at 345.
91. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring): "Free-
dom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues
and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.' The fact that they are not
amenable to the restraints of the political process only underscores the legitimate and sub-
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have access to the media to contradict defamatory statements92 and
have "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehoods concerning them. ' 93 The New York Times ac-
tual malice standard, therefore, strikes the proper balance between the
public's right to information concerning the conduct of public figures
and the state's interest in the protection of a public figure's reputation.
The Supreme Court in Gertz addressed the issue of whether to ex-
tend the actual malice standard to defamation actions involving private
persons. Because a private person, unlike a public official or public
figure, has limited access to the media to contradict defamatory false-
hoods and has not voluntarily exposed himself or herself to an in-
creased risk of defamation by shaping events in areas of concern to
society at large,94 the Court concluded that the New York Times actual
malice rule would be inappropriate in defamation actions involving
private persons.95 The Court focused upon the private person's status
as one who "has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of
his own good name, and consequently. . . has a more compelling call
on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
'96
The Court adopted the view that the states are permitted to define for
themselves the standard of liability for the publication of defamatory
falsehoods by media defendants concerning private persons, as long as
they do not allow liability without fault.
97
The Supreme Court has established a constitutional framework for
protecting freedom of expression in defamation cases in which the stan-
dard of protection applied is determined by the status of the person
defamed. 98 Freedom of expression, therefore, is tempered by the coun-
tervailing reputation interest. If the plaintiff is a public official or pub-
stantial nature of the interest, since it means that public opinion may be the only instrument
by which society can attempt to influence their conduct."
92. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
93. Id. at 345.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 346.
96. Id. at 345.
97. Id. at 347.
98. Prior to Gertz, the constitutional standard to be applied in defamation actions in-
volving private persons was unclear. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), the Court was unable to agree upon a majority position. In his plurality opinion,
Justice Brennan concluded that the actual malice standard should extend to defamatory
falsehoods about private persons, if the subject matter of the statement was of general or
public interest. Id. at 43. The opinion focused upon society's interest in learning about a
particular issue. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved." Id.
The Gertz majority stated that such a subject matter analysis failed to accommodate the




lic figure, the state may impose liability on a media defendant only if
actual malice can be proved. If the plaintiff is a private individual, on
the other hand, the first amendment interest is lessened and the power
of the state to protect its citizen's reputation is increased correspond-
ingly. Thus, the state may impose liability on a media defendant ab-
sent proof of actual malice.
The Edwards decision, however, bases constitutional protection
upon the newsworthiness of the statement; the status of the person de-
famed is only incidentally important to the Edwards analysis. Under
Edwards, the constitutional immunity of neutral reportage arises be-
cause the subject matter of the statement itself is a matter of public
importance, not because the statement about a public official or public
figure is a matter of public importance. To justify the "neutral report-
age" privilege, therefore, one must determine that it is consistent with
the first amendment position of the Supreme Court.99
Application of First Amendment Theory to the Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Supreme Court's defamation analysis has not altered the basic
common law rule that one who republishes a defamatory falsehood
also is liable for harm to the defamed individual's reputation. °° In
Edwards, therefore, when the Times reported that the National Audu-
bon Society had identified the five scientists as "paid liars," the Times
adopted the statement as its own.
Under the Supreme Court's first amendment theory, which em-
phasizes the speaker's right to criticize or to comment on the actions of
public officials or public figures, the appropriate analysis is to ascertain
the status of the individual defamed. If the defamed person is a public
99. Some commentators have suggested that the neutral reportage privilege is justified
by a greater first amendment interest in the republication of a known defamatory falsehood
because the fact that the falsehood is made is relevant to self-government. These commenta-
tors discount the constitutional balance between the first amendment interest in freedom of
expression and the state's interest in protecting reputation. They would endorse a neutral
reportage privilege even though the media defendant published negligently or with serious
doubts about the veracity of the underlying statements reported. See generally Sowle, supra
note 20; Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1266 (1977); Comment, Restricting the First Amendment Right to Republish Defamatory State-
ments, Ciand . Arew Times Publishing Co., 69 GEO. L.L 1495 (1981) (criticizing Cianei,
which limits the Edwards neutral reportage privilege, and suggesting a return to the Edwards
analysis); Note, Edwards . National.4udubon Society, Inc.: The Right to Print Known False-
hoods, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 943 (1979).
100. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Dixson v.
Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977); Olinger v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n,
409 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine & Broadcasting, Inc., 328
F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964). But see Medico v. Time, Inc.,
643 F.2d 134, 137-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 139 (1981). For a discussion of the
common law rule, see notes 12-15 & accompanying text supra.
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official or public figure, the actual malice standard must be met before
a media defendant may be held liable. If the plaintiff is a private per-
son, the constitutional standard minimally required for liability is neg-
ligence. The neutral reportage privilege, however, would not require
this analysis. If a statement were newsworthy, the reporter would be
immunized from liability, even though he or she knew of or recklessly
disregarded the falsity of the underlying statement. If the neutral re-
portage privilege were extended to all persons without regard to their
status, any person would be prevented from recovering for a defama-
tory statement republished by a media defendant, as long as the defam-
atory falsehoods were "newsworthy."
Courts that have either adopted or explained the neutral reportage
privilege have disagreed in their interpretation of the doctrine. Some
courts posit that the neutral reportage constitutional privilege would
apply regardless of the plaintiffs status as private person, public offi-
cial, or public figure.101 Under this analysis, the newsworthy defama-
tory falsehood would be privileged, irrespective of the reporter's
subjective awareness of the statement's falsity, if published in an accu-
rate and disinterested report. Other courts have limited the neutral
reportage privilege to statements concerning public officials or public
figures.'02 Both analyses conflict with the first amendment analysis ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in defamation cases.
The Neutral Reportage Privilege, the Newsworthiness Justification, and the
Private Person
Application of a constitutional privilege of neutral reportage to
newsworthy statements regardless of the status of the person defamed
appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 103 Time, Inc. v. Firestone,1°4 and Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Association, Inc. 10 5 These decisions repudiated the
subject matter, or newsworthiness, test as a basis for determining
whether the first amendment would protect a defamatory
publication. 106
In Gertz, the Court noted that a subject matter analysis fails to
101. Eg., Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Krauss
v. Champaign News Gazette, 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (1978) (privilege
applies to "public issues, personalities and programs").
102. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977); Weingarten v. Block,
102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 714, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Scher-
merhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 288, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 284 (1980).
103. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
104. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
105. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
106. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. at 166-69; Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. at 157; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345-48.
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accommodate adequately the state's interest in protecting a private per-
son's reputation.10 7 Moreover, the use of a subject matter test would
require judges to decide which publications were matters of public or
general interest. This test, the Court concluded, was inappropriate to
determine the proper standard applicable in defamation actions.
10 8
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the respondent sued Time for inaccu-
rately reporting a judicial proceeding, claiming the report was defama-
tory. The appellant contended that the New York Times actual malice
rule should apply to reports of judicial proceedings. 0 9 The Court re-
jected this argument, noting that in Gertz, the Court had repudiated a
subject matter test and had adopted a test focusing upon the status of
the plaintiff"10 In reaffirming Gertz's rejection of the subject matter
test, Firestone indicated ihe Court's unwillingness to expand first
amendment protection by giving a special privilege to reports of judi-
cial proceedings."'
In Woston, which represents the Court's most recent rejection of
the subject matter test, the Reader's Digest Association had published a
book in which the plaintiff was inaccurately identified as a Soviet
agent." 2 In fact, the plaintiff had only failed to appear before a grand
jury conducting investigations into the activities of Soviet agents in the
United States.' ' 3 Because the plaintiff's failure to appear had been re-
ported in the media, the Reader's Digest Association argued that the
plaintiff was a public figure and was required to prove that the defama-
tory statements had been published with actual malice." 4 The
107. 418 U.S. at 346. The defamatory article in Gerz was about the murder trial of a
police officer. Gertz was the attorney representing the victim's family in a civil suit against
the police officer. The statements defaming Gertz were not made in the course of reporting
on court proceedings. The statements originated with the author of the article appearing in
American Opinion. The aiticle stated that Gertz was "an architect of the 'frame-up'" of the
police officer in the murder trial and charged Gertz with past communist affiliations. Id. at
326.
108. 418 U.S. at 346.
109. 424 U.S. at 452-53. The defamatory article erroneously reported that Mrs. Fire-
stone's husband had been granted a divorce on grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty. Id.
at 452.
110. Id. at 455-56.
111. "Mhe suggested privilege is simply too broad. Imposing upon the law of private
defamation the rather drastic limitations worked by New York Times cannot be justified by
generalized references to the public interest in reports ofjudicial proceedings. The details of
many, if not most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward advancing the unin-
hibited debate on public issues thought to provide principal support for the decision in New
York Times .... There appears little reason why these individuals should substantially
forfeit that degree of protection which the law of defamation would otherwise afford them
simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom." Id. at 457.
112. 443 U.S. at 159, 160.
113. Id. at 162.
114. Seeid. at 165-68.
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Supreme Court rejected this position, holding that a private individual
is not automatically deemed a public figure merely by becoming in-
volved in or associated with a newsworthy matter." 15
Each of these decisions discredits the subject matter, or news-
worthiness, test as a basis for applying first amendment protection in
defamation actions.' 1 6 The Edwards neutral reportage privilege, how-
ever, gives media defendants an absolute immunity for reporting
"newsworthy" defamatory statements, regardless of the status of the
individual defamed. 17 Because the Court continually has refused to
base first amendment protection in defamation cases upon a news-
worthiness analysis, the Court probably also would reject an absolute
first amendment privilege triggered by the newsworthiness of the de-
famatory statement." 8
The Neutral Reportage Privilege and the Public Official or Public Figure
Finally, application of the neutral reportage privilege to news-
worthy but defamatory reports about public officials or public figures
attributable to "responsible" and "prominent" persons or organizations
also appears foreclosed by the Supreme Court decision of St. Amant v.
Thompson. 1 9 In that case, the Court refined its definition of actual
malice, which must be proven by a public official or public figure
before recovery in a defamation action.' 20 In New York Times, the
Court had stated that actual malice exists when a reporter publishes
"with knowledge that [the defamatory falsehood] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'12' In St. Amant, the
Court explained that reckless disregard of whether a statement was
false could be proved by "evidence [sufficient] to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
115. Id. at 167. The Court stated, "A libel defendant must show more than mere news-
worthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times." Id. at 167-
68.
116. See Comment, The Evolution of the Public Figure Doctrine in Defamation, 41 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1009 (1980).
117. See notes 35-50, 99 & accompanying text supra.
118. First amendment theory in defamation cases eliminates the self-censorship that ac-
companies doubt as to the truth or falsity of a statement; it does not protect defamatory
falsehood. See notes 68-98 & accompanying text supra. When a reporter knows the repub-
lished statement is defamatory, he or she intentionally inflicts injury to the defamed person's
reputation, see notes 12-15, 100 & accompanying text supra, and should be liable under the
Supreme Court's first amendment analysis. But see Sowle, supra note 20 at 519-21.
119. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
120. For a discussion of the actual malice test, see notes 75-93 & accompanying text
supra.
121. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
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for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."' 122
Thus, in St. Amant, the Court determined that subjective aware-
ness of the falsity of a defamatory statement makes one liable under a
New York Times actual malice standard. St. Amant reaffirms the
Court's theory that protection is afforded defamatory speech, not be-
cause of its inherent value, but because of the potential chilling effect
on truthful expression that would result if the press were subjected to
liability for publication of statements that they made reasonable efforts
to verify.1
3
In Dickey v. CBS, Inc.,124 the Third Circuit recognized the distinc-
tion between the Edwards neutral reportage privilege and the constitu-
tional privilege of fair comment enunciated by the Supreme Court, and
rejected Edwards as inconsistent with St. Amant.125 In Dickey, a public
official was defamed by his opponent in a pending election. This de-
famatory falsehood was later republished during a television broadcast.
The television station asserted that the Edwards neutral reportage priv-
ilege applied to that republication. The Dickey court reasoned, how-
ever, that if the television station were aware that the statement was
false, or had entertained serious doubts about its truth or falsity, the
station would be liable for republication of the defamatory falsehood
under a New York Times actual malice analysis.126 The Third Circuit
noted that the newsworthiness analysis that triggers the application of
neutral reportage had been specifically rejected in Gertz.12 7 The appli-
cation of the New York Times standard, the Third Circuit stated, must
be determined by reference to the status of the defamed, not to the
content of the defamatory statement.1 28 Moreover, the court concluded
that, even when the defamed person is a public official or public figure,
absolute immunity is foreclosed by St. Amant.129
122. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
123. St. Amant applied the New York Times rationale: the first amendment protects the
dissemination of truthful information through protection of freedom of expression; a re-
porter who entertains serious doubts about the truth or falsity of the publication does not
publish with the belief that his or her report is truthful. Id. at 732.
124. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
125. .Id. at 1225-26.
126. Id. at 1227-28.
127. Id. at 1226 n.5.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1227-28. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Court rejected a
claim of constitutional privilege against discovery concerning the editorial process. Discov-
ery into the editorial processes cannot be precluded absolutely by a constitutional editorial
privilege because the actual malice standard requires an inquiry into the subjective aware-
ness of the publisher. Id. at 169-70. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
"Ithose who publish defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability. . . are subject to
liability, the aim being not only to compensate for injury but to deter publication of unpro-
tected material threatening injury to individual reputation." Id. at 172.
This statement of the purpose underlying the actual malice standard succinctly articu-
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The Dickey decision clearly is the better approach. By focusing
upon the status of the person defamed, the Dickey court preserved the
constitutional balance between the public's interest in freedom of ex-
pression and the state's interest in protecting the reputation of its citi-
zens.1 30 The Edwards neutral reportage privilege does not preserve the
constitutional balance established by the Supreme Court, and is incon-
sistent with the Court's approach. Although the Supreme Court has
limited the state's power to protect individual reputation, the Edwards
neutral reportage privilege requires the courts to discount totally the
reputational interest of the defamed person. Edwards, therefore, does
not provide sufficient protection to individual reputational interests and
is unlikely to be adopted by the Court.'
3 '
Conclusion
The Edwards decision epitomizes a common misconception in
constitutional law, that certain defamatory statements are inherently
worthy of first amendment protection because they provide informa-
tion necessary for effective self-government. Defamatory falsehoods,
however, have no constitutional value and do not enhance self-govern-
ment. New York Times and its progeny did not recognize that a defam-
atory falsehood has inherent constitutional value; in fact, they
specifically rejected this notion. To ensure that the first amendment
interest in freedom of expression is not inhibited, however, the Court
has established minimum constitutional standards to limit self-censor-
ship. To achieve this goal, the state's interest in the protection of indi-
vidual reputation must be limited. New York Times and its progeny
lates the rationale for not adopting an Edwards neutral reportage privilege. Edwards focuses
upon the public's need for information as the justification for providing absolute immunity
in republication cases. Herbert, in rejecting the editorial privilege, stresses the counter-
vailing consideration, protection of reputation. The first amendment theory predicated
upon the status of the plaintiff balances these interests in a constitutional context and arrives
at minimum standards that are constitutionally required. The state may provide any degree
of protection above the minimum standards established by the Supreme Court. See note 131
infra.
130. See note 83 supra.
131. This conclusion is not intended to suggest that the common law fair report privilege
has been abrogated. On the contrary, evolution of the fair report privilege by the states is
consistent with the constitutional analysis employed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court merely has balanced countervailing interests: the public interest in freedom of expres-
sion and the state interest in protection of individual reputation. The resulting analysis-
when the Court focuses upon the status of the person defamed-creates minimum standards.
By acknowledging the state's legitimate interest as well as the public's interest in freedom of
expression, the Court has implicitly recognized that the state may develop its fair report
privilege without being inconsistent with constitutional first amendment theory. The state
may provide greater protection to the publisher of the defamatory falsehood through the
common law fair report privilege, because the state itself determines the degree of protection
it wishes to provide its citizens.
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acknowledge the state's interest in protecting individual reputation as a
substantial one, even as they limit the state's power to provide such
protection. The Court has created a first amendment analysis that bal-
ances the countervailing interest by focusing upon the status of the per-
son defamed.
Viewed from this perspective, the Edwards decision obviously is
not consistent with first amendment theory. The neutral reportage
privilege does not sufficiently accommodate the countervailing interests
recognized by the Supreme Court. Absolute immunity would be given
to any newsworthy statement without inquiry into the status of the per-
son defamed or into the reporter's subjective awareness of the false-
hood he or she published. A neutral reportage privilege, therefore,
would require a revolutionary first amendment analysis and would not
sufficiently recognize the value of the individual's reputation.
Dennis J Dobbels*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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